Protecting Rebates from Miner Games with R-TFRM

Table of Links

Abstract and 1. Introduction

2. Related Work

3. Preliminaries

   3.1 TFMs: Desirable Properties

   3.2 Groves’ Redistribution Mechanism (RM)

4. IDEAL-TFRM: Impossibility of Achieving Strictly Positive Redistribution Index

5. Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanism (TFRM)

6. R-TFRM: A TFRM Robust to Miner Manipulation

   6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue

7. R2-TFRM: Robust and Rational TFRM

8. Conclusion and References

A. Proofs for Results from Section 4 and 5

B. Proofs for Results from Section 6

C. Proofs for Results from Section 7

6 R-TFRM: A TFRM ROBUST TO MINER MANIPULATION

Using Claims 3 and 4, we reformulate the linear program in Figure 3 so that it is independent of the bid vectors. Figure 4 presents this reformulated LP.

Optimal worst-case Redistribution Fraction. We next provide the analytical solution to the linear program in Figure 4 and thereby also state the optimal worst-case fraction redistributed.

6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue

From Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we see that in R-TFRM, the fraction of payments redistributed to the top-k users, i.e., 𝑘/𝑛, is the same for honest and strategic miner. This implies that R-TFRM is resilient to miner manipulation while being worst-case optimal.