Serverless computing is often marketed as a way to eliminate infrastructure management and accelerate software delivery. While this promise is largely true, it also creates a dangerous misconception that removing servers removes security risks. In reality, serverless architectures shift security responsibilities rather than eliminate them. Short-lived functions, event-driven execution models, and managed runtime environments introduce new attack surfaces that many organizations often overlook. Misconfigured permissions, untrusted event data, and reuse of runtime context can silently expose sensitive systems. This article explores the most critical security risks in serverless environments and provides practical guidance for securing modern FaaS applications.

Before starting to read, you may want to bookmark the Serverless / FaaS Security Cheat Sheet created by me!

Introduction

Serverless computing has fundamentally changed how modern applications are built and deployed. Platforms such as AWS Lambda, Azure Functions, and Google Cloud Functions allow developers to focus purely on code while cloud providers manage infrastructure, scaling, and runtime environments.

This abstraction dramatically improves agility and scalability — but it also introduces new and often misunderstood security challenges.

Unlike traditional server-based systems, serverless workloads operate as short-lived, event-driven functions running in managed and frequently shared environments. This execution model changes threat surfaces, attack vectors, and defensive strategies.

This guide outlines practical security risks in serverless environments and provides actionable best practices to help teams build secure FaaS-based applications.

Why Serverless Security Is Different

Traditional infrastructure security revolves around operating system hardening, network perimeter controls, and patch management. Serverless architectures shift responsibility boundaries.

Developers no longer manage servers — but they now become directly responsible for:

Misconfigurations or insecure event handling can quickly expose entire cloud environments.

Key Security Risks in Serverless Architectures

1. Over-Permissioned Functions

One of the most common vulnerabilities in serverless systems is overly permissive IAM roles. Developers often assign wildcard policies (*) for convenience, unintentionally enabling lateral movement or privilege escalation if a function becomes compromised.

2. Unvalidated Event Inputs

Serverless applications are inherently event-driven. Triggers such as:

are all external input sources. If payloads are not validated, attackers may inject malicious content, resulting in injection attacks, deserialization vulnerabilities, or business logic abuse.

3. Cold Start Data Leakage

Although functions appear ephemeral, runtime containers may be reused. Sensitive data stored in memory, static variables, or temporary directories (e.g., /tmp) may persist across invocations.

This can enable data leakage or side-channel attacks.

4. Function Chaining Abuse

Serverless applications typically comprise multiple interconnected functions. If one function is compromised, attackers may exploit implicit trust relationships to invoke downstream services or escalate privileges.

5. Shared Environment Risks

Serverless platforms are typically multi-tenant. Improper isolation or leftover execution artifacts may introduce cross-tenant or cross-invocation exposure risks.

6. Hardcoded Secrets

Embedding credentials inside code or environment variables remains a frequent but dangerous anti-pattern. Such secrets can leak through logs, memory dumps, or repository exposure.

7. Excessive Network Access

Functions with unrestricted outbound internet access may allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data or communicate with malicious command-and-control infrastructure.

Serverless Security Best Practices

1. Apply the Principle of Least Privilege

Each function should only have permissions strictly required for its operation. Avoid shared IAM roles across multiple functions.

Bad IAM Policy

{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "*",
  "Resource": "*"
}

Good IAM Policy

{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": ["dynamodb:GetItem", "dynamodb:PutItem"],
  "Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:us-east-1:123456789012:table/Orders"
}

Fine-grained permission models significantly reduce blast radius during compromise scenarios.

2. Enforce Environment Isolation

Serverless functions should not automatically receive unrestricted network access.

Recommended strategies include:

Example: AWS Lambda VPC Configuration

VpcConfig:
  SubnetIds:
    - subnet-123456
  SecurityGroupIds:
    - sg-restrict-outbound

3. Secure Function Invocation

All triggers should enforce authentication and authorization.

Best practices include:

Example: JWT Authorization via API Gateway

{
  "Type": "JWT",
  "IdentitySource": "$request.header.Authorization",
  "Issuer": "https://secure-idp.example.com/",
  "Audience": "my-api-client"
}

4. Validate All Event Data

Event payloads must always be treated as untrusted input.

Defensive techniques include:

Python Input Validation Example

import json
import re

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    body = json.loads(event["body"])
    email = body.get("email", "")

    if not re.match(r"[^@]+@[^@]+\.[^@]+", email):
        return {"statusCode": 400, "body": "Invalid email"}

    return {"statusCode": 200, "body": "OK"}

5. Protect Execution Context and Cold Start Behavior

Developers should never assume execution environments are fully reset between invocations.

Insecure Pattern

SECRET_KEY = "hardcoded-secret"

Secure Pattern

import os
from my_secrets_lib import get_secret

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    secret = get_secret("db-password")

Additionally:

6. Implement Secure Secrets Management

Secrets must never be stored inside code repositories or environment variables.

Use secure secret storage services such as:

Additional protections include:

AWS Secrets Retrieval Example

import boto3, json

def get_secret(secret_name):
    client = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
    response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=secret_name)
    return json.loads(response["SecretString"])

7. Strengthen Monitoring and Logging

Serverless observability is critical for incident detection and forensic analysis.

Recommendations:

Example: Redacting Sensitive Fields

import logging

def log_event(event):
    safe_event = {k: ("***" if "password" in k else v) for k,v in event.items()}
    logging.info(safe_event)

8. Address Supply Chain Security Risks

Third-party dependencies represent a significant attack vector in serverless environments.

Mitigation strategies include:

Example: Hash Validation

shasum -a 256 layer.zip

Do’s and Don’ts Summary

Do

Don’t

Final Thoughts

Serverless architectures significantly improve scalability and development velocity, but they shift security responsibilities toward identity control, event validation, and runtime protection.

Organizations adopting serverless must update their threat models and security controls accordingly. Strong IAM discipline, input validation, secrets management, and observability together form the foundation of secure serverless deployments.

Security in serverless environments is not about protecting servers — it is about protecting functions, identities, and events.

About the Author

If you are working on application security, cloud security, or offensive security testing, feel free to connect and share insights. kadirarslan1

The serverless ecosystem is evolving rapidly, and collaborative knowledge sharing is critical for building safer cloud-native systems.